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Abstract 
 
We survey landowners to investigate the costs associated with the presence of permanent 
or seasonal wetland areas in cropland.  We find, as predicted by our conceptual model, 
that dispersion of wetland areas imposes substantial inconvenience costs for producers 
but that costs respond nonlinearly and irregularly to changes in the frequency of 
hydration.  Producer attitudes toward conservation and environmental regulation have a 
significant impact on perceived costs, as do some demographic attributes.  The analysis 
suggests that incentives to aggregate dispersed wetlands into larger contiguous areas 
could benefit landowners while at the same time provide a net increase in wetland area.   
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Farmers’ Perceived Costs of Wetlands: Effects of Wetland Size, Hydration, and 
Dispersion 
 
At the time of European settlement, the U.S. had about 215 million acres of wetlands, but 
by the mid 1970’s less than half of these wetland areas remained (Blackwell 1995).  
According to Hansen (2006) about 15 percent (or about 16.6 million acres) of wetlands 
today are found on land used for crop production or pasture.  Wetlands provide a number 
of benefits including habitats for fish and wildlife, filtering and purifying water, buffering 
the effects of storms and floods, and, in some cases, recreational services (Heimlich et al. 
1998). But, because most of these beneficial services are non-market goods and cannot be 
sold, landowners have incentives to convert wetlands to agricultural use.  
Although plains states such as Kansas and Nebraska have relatively small wetland 
acreages, the wetlands that do exist are unique natural resources and provide important 
ecosystem services. The Cheyenne Bottoms in central Kansas is viewed as the most 
important site for shorebird migration in North America (Collins, Collins, and Gress 
1994).  Small playa lakes in western Kansas, western Nebraska and eastern Colorado 
hold surface runoff following rain events and are the primary portals through which the 
Ogallala Aquifer is recharged (Stone 1990). Over 95% of the world’s playa lakes are 
found in the Great Plains (Playa Lakes Joint Venture 2006). 
Over the past few decades a number of policies have been introduced to preserve 
wetlands.  The Swampbuster provisions of the 1985 Food Security Act deny federal farm 
program benefits to producers who convert wetlands to cropland, while the Wetland 
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Reserve Program (WRP) introduced in the 1990 Food, Agriculture, and Trade Act 
provides incentives for restoring farmed wetlands to their original condition through 
easement payments and cost sharing.  Since the early 1990’s the goal of federal wetlands 
policy has been one of “no net loss” with losses offset through restoration and creation of 
new wetland areas.  The 2002 Farm Act provides for increased wetland restoration via 
expansion of both the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the WRP.  For example, 
of the 2.8-million-acre increase in the CRP, up to 500,000 acres could be used for 
restoration of farmed wetlands (Claassen 2003).     
Both the benefits and costs of protecting wetlands must be quantified to evaluate 
these policies and proposed changes based on economic efficiency criteria. Perhaps 
because the benefits of wetlands were historically ignored and occur in the form of 
nonmarket gains, there is now a large literature on estimating the various social benefits 
from wetlands. Heimlich et al. (1998) compiled and reviewed the estimated nonmarket 
values of wetlands. Although the estimates vary across studies, the values are generally 
significant for a range of nonmarket goods and services, including recreation, species 
habitat, flood control, waste assimilation, and visual amenities. 
The costs that wetlands impose on landowners have received comparatively little 
attention, and hedonic studies that have inferred these costs from agricultural land values 
have produced conflicting results. Norris, Ahern, and Koontz (1994) found that increased 
exposure to wetland regulation had little effect on land prices. Brown (1976) examined 
land sale prices in North and South Dakota and found that wetland easements had a 
significant negative impact on sales value in two of three study regions.  Surprisingly, the 
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presence of non-eased wetland areas did not have a significant impact on price, but 
Schultz and Taff (2004) pointed to a specification error in Brown’s model that may have 
led to that finding.  In their own study, Schultz and Taff found that non-eased permanent 
wetlands reduced land prices by $161/acre while permanent wetlands under easement 
reduced price by $321/acre.  An unexpected finding was that temporary wetlands, 
whether under easement or not, did not have a significant effect on price.   
An acknowledged limitation of the wetland cost literature, which may partially 
explain some of the ambiguous findings, is the inability to capture the highly contextual 
nature of the costs associated with the presence of wetland areas.  Shultz and Taff (2004) 
note the limitations of earlier hedonic studies including lack of site specific data, and the 
inability to account for agricultural production potential.  And while their study accounts 
for productivity and for important wetland characteristics (i.e., size, temporary or 
permanent, eased or not-eased), they acknowledge that other factors such as dispersion 
may also affect cost.  Thus, a wetland that is highly dispersed in several small hydrated 
areas within a field will generate substantial “nuisance costs” from driving tillage 
equipment around each area. Furthermore, the frequency of wetness determines how 
often a crop can be harvested, and hence the probability distribution of returns from the 
field.  
We develop a conceptual framework where wetland costs are derived using a 
model of production under uncertainty. For a field containing wetlands, the production 
returns on both the wetland acreage and the remaining upland acreage (i.e., the non-
wetland portion of the field) are uncertain and depend on random rainfall amounts. The 
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implicit cost of wetlands is defined as the certainty equivalent of the gain from converting 
all wetlands in the field to uplands. We show that this cost unambiguously increases with 
wetland dispersion, measured as the number of distinct wetland areas in the field. 
However, costs can either increase or decrease with respect to changes in the frequency 
that the wetlands are hydrated and the wetland acreage. These ambiguous results are due 
to the negative correlation between incomes on the wetland and upland acreage; wetlands 
are productive in years of low rainfall when there is likely to be a crop failure on the 
upland acreage. In some cases, risk averse farmers may benefit from increasing the 
wetland acreage or from an increased frequency of hydration on the wetland areas. 
We apply this conceptual framework to empirically estimate the cost associated 
with the presence of wetlands. Using contingent valuation survey data from a sample of 
982 Kansas producers, we estimate perceived wetland costs as a function of wetland 
characteristics, farm characteristics, and producer attributes and attitudes. Consistent with 
the prediction from the conceptual model, costs are found to increase with wetland 
dispersion but respond nonlinearly and irregularly to changes in the frequency of 
hydration.  Producer attitudes toward conservation and environmental regulation have a 
significant impact on perceived costs, as do demographic attributes such as age and 
education level. We also find evidence of a small economies of scale effect, as farm size 
is associated with a slight reduction in perceived costs.  
The Swampbuster Provision 
While several policies have been adopted to preserve wetlands as discussed above, the 
policy affecting the greatest number of landowners is the “Swampbuster provision” 
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included in all Farm Acts since 1985.  Although this term does not appear in the statutes 
themselves, the Swampbuster provision is understood to refer to the regulations 
determining persons’ eligibility for receiving certain USDA program benefits1 (7 CFR 
12). In order to remain eligible for farm program payments, Swampbuster requires that 
producers have neither converted wetlands after November 28, 1990 nor raised a crop on 
a wetland converted after December 23, 1985.
2
 However, persons can be considered 
exempt from this eligibility requirement for a number of reasons. Beginning with the 
1996 Farm Act, one of these exemptions is wetland mitigation, whereby “wetland 
functions and values [lost from wetland conversion] are adequately mitigated … through 
the restoration of a converted wetland, the enhancement of an existing wetland, or the 
creation of a new wetland....” (7 CFR 12.5 (b) (4)). Thus, at least in certain cases, 
“redistributing” wetlands is permitted, in the sense that one area can be converted if 
another is created or enhanced by an equivalent amount.  
 A common misconception is that Swampbuster protects all wetlands from farming 
activity of any kind. In fact, the regulations explicitly allow production activities on 
wetlands as long as woody vegetation is not removed.  Thus, Swampbuster allows nearly 
all existing wetlands to be farmed, and in practice nearly all such areas in the Plains are 
planted to crops if it is economic to do so.
3
  This implies that the welfare effects of 
Swampbuster are not from preventing production activity per se, but from preventing 
conversion activities that would allow production to occur more frequently. Farmers 
incur welfare losses equal to the additional income they could earn on wetland areas if 
those areas were converted, less the cost of conversion.  
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In this article we elicit the perceived costs associated with the presence of wetland 
areas in cropland.  Prior studies (Schultz and Taff 2004) draw a clear distinction between 
costs associated with the presence of wetlands and the costs associated with regulations 
such as Swampbuster that restrict or prohibit the conversion of such wetlands.  In the 
concluding section of the article we address the interpretation of the perceived costs we 
elicit, and how they are related to welfare losses arising from such regulations.   
Conceptual Model 
This section develops a conceptual model to establish a precise definition of wetland 
costs and to determine how these costs depend on wetland characteristics. Consider a 
farmer who owns an a-acre field. The field contains n distinct areas that are designated as 
wetlands, but the degree to which these areas are hydrated depends on seasonal rainfall. 
The amount of rainfall received, x, is a random variable with cumulative distribution 
function F(x) and support [ , ]x x . If rainfall is at its maximum level x , all n areas are 
saturated to their full extent and they collectively cover aw  a acres. As x decreases 
below x , a smaller fraction of the aw acres are saturated. The remaining a – aw acres are 
never saturated to the point of preventing production activity; they comprise the upland 
portion of the field.  
 The net return from crop production on the wetland portion of the field is w(aw, 
x; h), where h is a parameter that measures the proneness to hydration. Higher levels of h 
imply that a larger share of the aw wetland acres are hydrated at a given rainfall level. The 
wetland net return function is increasing and weakly concave in aw (if all wetland acreage 
is of undifferentiated quality then it will be linear in aw), and satisfies w(0, x; h) = 0. Its 
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dependence on the other two arguments is illustrated in figure 1. This figure traces out the 
relationship between wetland net returns and x for two fields that are otherwise identical 
but differ in their proneness to hydration (h1 > h0). As shown for both these cases, net 
returns initially increase with respect to rainfall, reflecting the fact that in dry years, most 
of the wetland acreage can be farmed with normal practices and additional rainfall will 
increase yields on this portion of the field. Beyond some level of rainfall, however, net 
returns decrease because yields are reduced from excessive moisture and because a larger 
share of the wetland acreage is too wet to be farmed at all. For the two functions shown 
in the figure, net returns reach zero when rainfall reaches x1 and x0, respectively.  
 Figure 1 also illustrates that the proneness to hydration affects the distribution of 
income in two ways. First, wetlands that are less prone to hydration generate positive 
income over a larger range of rainfall. While the wetlands on the “wetter” field 
(corresponding to h1), generate a positive income with probability p1, the wetlands on the 
“drier” field do so with probability p0 > p1.  Second, as the figure illustrates, the change in 
h may either increase or decrease the level of wetland profits depending on the value of x. 
For the case shown, the “drier” field has lower wetland net returns for values of x < xˆ  but 
higher net returns for xˆ < x < x0. 
 Uplands are assumed to be farmed in all rainfall conditions, and net returns on 
this portion of the field are (a – aw, x, n). Similar to the wetland net returns, this function 
is increasing and weakly concave in its first argument (implying that /aw  0), and has 
the property (0, x, n) = 0. It is also concave in x. Upland net returns depend on the 
number of wetland areas, n, because equipment must be driven around the wetlands areas 
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when they are hydrated. This additional tillage cost is assumed to increase with the 
number of wetland areas, so that /n  0. For a fixed wetland area aw, larger values of n 
imply that the wetland acreage is more dispersed throughout the field. Accordingly, we 
refer to n as the dispersion parameter. 
 In sum, there are three wetland characteristics in the model: size or coverage, aw; 
dispersion, n; and proneness to hydration, h. These three parameters determine the 
expected utility the farmer can obtain from a given field, E[u(m)], where u() is a strictly 
increasing utility-of-income function. In particular, expected utility from the a-acre parcel 
is  
(1)     ( , , ) , ; , , ( )
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where    , ; , ,w w wm a x h a a x n    . Only the marginal effect with respect to n in 
equation (3) can be unambiguously signed. Because u(m) is positive and /n is 
negative by assumption, expected utility declines with the number of wetland areas. In 
equation (2), the first term inside the parentheses represents the change in wetland profits 
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from an increase in wetland acreage, which is positive, while the second is the change in 
upland profits, which is negative. The marginal effect on expected utility depends on 
which of these effects is larger. Intuitively, an increase in wetland acreage may be 
beneficial for risk-averse farmers over some range of aw, because this change would 
reduce overall production risk: in dry years when upland acreage produces small or 
negative profits, positive profits can be earned on the wetland acreage. Put differently, 
wetland and upland acreages are assets with negatively correlated returns; and risk-averse 
farmers may benefit by better diversifying their acreage portfolio. Regarding equation (4)
, the sign of w/h may vary throughout the domain of x depending on the specific 
resource setting, as shown in figure 1. The net impact of h on expected utility therefore is 
also ambiguous.  
 We now turn to defining the perceived cost of wetlands. We begin by noting that 
an intuitive property of equation (4) is that if aw = n = 0, U/h = 0 for all h; expected 
utility is independent of h when there are no wetlands in the field. We can therefore 
define the certainty equivalent of farming a field with no wetlands, mˆ , by the equation 
(5) ˆ(0,0, ) ( )U h u m  
The certainty equivalent of farming a field containing wetlands with parameters (aw, n, h) 
will differ from mˆ  by some amount cw, which we regard as the cost of wetlands. This 
cost implicitly depends on all three parameters, so that there exists a wetland cost 
function cw(aw, n, h) defined by the relationship 
(6) ˆ( , , ) ( ( , , ))w w wU a n h u m c a n h   
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The marginal effects of the parameters on costs can be found by differentiating (6). The 
effect of wetland acreage, for instance, is cw/aw = –(U/aw)/u( mˆ  – cw). As u() is 
positive, the sign of cw/aw is opposite that of U/aw in equation (2). By identical 
arguments, the marginal effects of n and h on costs take on the reverse signs as those on 
U in equations (3) and (4). The model therefore predicts that wetland costs increase with 
the number of wetland areas but may either increase or decrease with wetland acreage 
and the proneness to hydration. 
Data 
Data were collected from a contingent valuation (CV) mail survey eliciting farmers’ 
willingness to pay to rent land containing wetland areas.  The CV method asks 
individuals to state their values for non-marketed goods – typically environmental 
amenities or improvements therein (e.g., preservation of wilderness areas, improved 
visibility).  Our use differs in that our purpose is to estimate the value of a private good 
(land) containing a particular attribute (wetlands).  
While widely used, the CV approach has been the subject of controversy (see 
Diamond and Hausmann 1994; Hanemann 1994).  A central question is whether values 
elicited from hypothetical surveys reflect the amounts individuals would actually pay and 
evidence on this question is mixed. Several studies indicate an upward bias in CV values 
(e.g., Fox et al. 1998; Taylor 1998), and mechanisms such as “cheap talk” (Cummings 
and Taylor 1999) have been used to counter that bias.  However, Carson et al. (1996) 
found the opposite – in a meta-analysis of 83 studies, they found that CV values tended to 
be slightly below their revealed preference counterparts.  More recently, Cameron et al. 
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(2002) found that WTP derived from most of the common types of CV survey questions 
were statistically indistinguishable from revealed WTP.  
The survey instrument was sent in two mailings to a sample of 2,311 producers 
comprising the membership of the Kansas Farm Management Association (KMFA). 
Given the availability of detailed farm business and financial records from KFMA 
members, this database is frequently used in survey research. The survey instrument was 
pre-tested in four one-on-one interviews with KFMA members. Prior to mailing, each of 
the KFMA fieldmen – agents who have regular contact with the members – was 
contacted and informed about the purpose of the survey.  They were asked to encourage 
their clients to respond and to provide assistance or clarification if the need arose.
4
  Of 
the 2,311 surveys sent in the first mailing, 638 were returned, and a second mailing to 
non-respondents resulted in an additional 344 responses. Thirty-six surveys were 
undeliverable, giving a response rate of 982 out of 2,275, or about 43%.   
In addition to eliciting the contingent values of farmland with wetland areas, the 
survey also obtained characteristics of the respondent and his/her farm, along with the 
respondent’s attitudes toward wetland protection and environmental issues more 
generally. These categories of data are discussed in turn below.  
Contingent Rental Values of Farmland with Wetlands 
Six questions on the survey asked respondents the maximum amount they would be 
willing to pay (WTP) per acre to rent quarter-sections of land containing various types of 
wetlands. Three questions dealt with permanent wetlands, while three similar questions 
dealt with seasonal wetlands. Figure 2 illustrates the presentation of the questions for 
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permanent wetlands.
5
 As shown in figure 2, the three quarter-sections with wetlands 
differed in the distribution of those wetlands – on one the wetland was contained in a 
single contiguous area, in a second it was dispersed in four separate areas, and on the 
third it was dispersed in sixteen separate areas. In alternative versions of the survey, the 
(combined) wetlands in each quarter section accounted for 1%, 2%, 3%, or 4% of land 
area. Within each version, 4 subversions of the question dealing with seasonal wetlands 
elicited rental values for land containing wetlands that were hydrated 1 year, 2 years, 3 
years, or 4 years out of 5.  Thus, there were a total of 16 alternative versions of the 
instrument. 
Our elicitation format can be described as “open ended with anchoring.” 
Respondents were told that “tracts of similar quality land with no wetlands rent for $35 
per acre,” and were asked to report the maximum rental rate they would pay for cropland 
containing different types of wetlands. While open-ended questions are simple and 
straightforward, they have been criticized because they may not be incentive compatible: 
when asked to report the cost of providing a public good, respondents would have an 
incentive to overstate their actual costs due to the well known free-rider problem. 
Because wetlands have public good attributes, it is possible that respondents exaggerated 
the cost of having wetlands by understating their rental values for land with wetland.  
However, if the extent to which this occurs is uniform across different scenarios, we will 
still obtain valid estimates of the relative costs of different wetland characteristics (e.g., 
the difference in cost for wetlands that are hydrated 1 year in 5 compared to those that are 
hydrated 4 years out of 5).
6
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The “anchor” of $35 per acre was used for a number of reasons. The primary 
purpose was to provide a common cue about land quality, so that we could control for 
unobservable differences in respondents’ beliefs about land productivity. The second 
purpose was to make the open ended questions easier to answer, by inducing respondents 
to compare the fields with wetlands to a market good they are familiar with (Arrow et al. 
1993). Third, we believed it would focus the respondents’ attention on the relevant 
question – the additional costs of farming fields with wetlands – rather than their 
willingness to rent land in general.
7
 The value of $35 was obtained from the KFMA 
database as a typical rental rate across all regions in the state.  
Summary statistics for the WTP responses are in table 1. Producers are willing-to-
pay slightly less for cropland that contains permanent wetland areas compared to land 
that contains seasonal wetlands.  For example, for land containing 16 permanent wetland 
areas, the average WTP is $16.76/acre compared to $19.77/acre for land containing 16 
seasonal wetlands.  The data clearly show that higher numbers of wet areas are associated 
with lower rental values.  For permanent wetlands, when the dispersion increases from 1 
area to 4 areas, the average rental value falls from $31.43/acre to $27.12/acre.   
An interesting result is the large number of zero values of WTP for quarter 
sections containing wetlands dispersed in 16 areas. Clearly, respondents interpret such a 
wide dispersion of wetland pockets as imposing very significant inconvenience costs for 
tillage operations.  Nevertheless, for the analysis that follows we interpret zeros WTP 
values as “protest values” because it is reasonable to believe that they under represent the 
true value for the land area.  These “protest values” are not included in the subsequent 
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analyses. At the other extreme, there were several bids at $35/acre for quarter sections 
containing only one wetland area or four seasonal wetland areas. For example, for land 
containing one seasonal wetland, 289 of the 810 bids (35%) were at $35/acre, thus 
reflecting zero perceived cost associated with the presence of the wetland.  Given the 
number of “zero cost” observations, our subsequent analysis of those bids employs the 
Tobit model.  Our data also included six bids for land with wetlands that were above the 
$35 rental rate for land containing no wetlands.  It is possible that some respondents 
viewed the presence of hydrated areas as beneficial (in fact, as noted below, respondents 
viewed the average productivity of farmed wetland areas as only slightly below that of 
their non-wetland acres).  In the analysis we treat these observations as reflecting a zero 
cost for wetlands.
8
 
 The perceived cost of wetlands was calculated as the difference between the 
maximum amount a respondent was willing-to-pay (WTP) for land containing wetlands 
and the given rental rate for land with no wetlands ($35/acre).  Thus for example, if a 
respondent indicated a maximum WTP of $30 per acre, then the cost of wetlands is taken 
to be $5/acre ($35-$30).  
Producer Characteristics and Attitudes 
Characteristics of the survey respondents, including summary statistics for gender, age, 
and education, are reported in the top half of table 2. The average respondent operated a 
total of about 1,300 cropland acres, of which 513 or 39% are owned and the remainder 
are rented. About 16% of respondents indicated that their farm contains areas designated 
by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) as wetlands. A majority of these 
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respondents indicated that they would drain or fill some of their wetlands if permitted to 
do so. On average, respondents with wetlands can harvest those areas 2.83 years out of 
five, and the average productivity of seasonal wetlands, when harvested, was only 
slightly below the average of surrounding non-wetland acres.  About 55% of respondents 
reported average (30%) or above average (25%) productivity on wetland acres.  Deer 
were the most commonly observed wildlife species – observed by over 97% of 
respondents on their land – and 25% of respondents indicated that they idled land or 
changed management practices for the specific purpose of helping wildlife.  
Attitudes regarding wetlands and environmental legislation are reported in the 
bottom half of table 2. All responses were elicited using an inverted Likert scale (1 = 
strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree).  On average, 
respondents were neutral on whether or not draining or filling seasonal wetlands was 
beneficial to wildlife. However, respondents tended to agree that drainage restrictions 
reduced annual income and reduced the value of land – the average response was 2.01 to 
each statement. The average respondent was neutral or in slight agreement with the 
statements that endangered animals and plants in Kansas should be protected, and 
disagreed with the idea that the State of Kansas should buy more land to support 
endangered species.  On average, respondents slightly agreed with the statement that the 
State of Kansas should make annual payments to producers for land management 
practices designed to benefit endangered species. Producers agreed with the statement 
that the prohibition of draining or filling wetland area is unfair to producers (the mean 
response was 2.0).  Respondents agreed more strongly that the same restrictions imposed 
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costs on producers.  Finally, respondents agreed even more strongly (average response of 
1.677) that environmental legislation is often unfair to producers. 
Empirical Analysis of Perceived Wetland Costs 
Tobit regression was used to estimate a wetland cost function using the data described 
above. The dependent variable was the imputed cost of wetlands based on the WTP 
responses, corresponding to cw in the conceptual model; as discussed above, our 
observations of cost are censored at a value of zero. Independent variables included 
characteristics of the wetland as well as those of the producer and his farm operation.   
The relevant wetland characteristics are the arguments of the wetland cost 
function (see equation (6)): wetland acreage (aw), the number of wetlands (n), and 
proneness to hydration (h). While the conceptual model captures the relationships among 
these variables, it is uninformative about the shape of the cost function. The only 
unambiguous result was that costs increase in the number of wetland areas. Costs may 
either increase or decrease in the other variables, and in principle the direction of the 
response may change several times throughout a variable’s domain. Most parametric 
functional forms are too restrictive to detect these types of irregularities, as they limit the 
number of inflection points and local minima and maxima.  
In order to capture potentially irregular shapes in the cost function we first 
estimated a model in which each wetland characteristic was represented by a set of 
dummy variables. Thus, wetland acreage was represented by the dummy variables 2% 
Wetland Coverage, 3% Wetland Coverage and 4% Wetland Coverage (with 1% wetland 
area as the omitted base group). Similarly, the number of wetland areas is captured by the 
 17 
variables 4 Wetland Areas and 16 Wetland Areas, and proneness to hydration by the set 
of variables Wet 2 Years in 5, ..., Wet 5 Years in 5. Next, to test the non-linearity of the 
cost function in those wetland attributes, we estimated a series of null models in which 
one of the three attributes was modeled linearly while the other two followed our dummy 
formulation. Likelihood-ratio tests indicated rejection of the null hypotheses that costs 
varied linearly with: a) the number of wetland areas and b) frequency of hydration, but 
did not reject the hypothesis that costs varied linearly with wetland coverage (LR = 4.38, 
Chi-square = 5.99 at the 95% level of significance). Thus the model reported in table 3 
specifies a linear relationship between perceived cost and wetland coverage.
9
   
The farm characteristics included measures of scale, location, the presence of 
wetlands, and the presence of wildlife. The scale measure was total acreage, Total Acres 
= Acres Owned + Acres Rented.  We expect Total Acres to have a negative coefficient if 
economies of scale are effective at reducing the cost of wetlands.  Location is represented 
by a block of dummy variables delineating different regions of Kansas with North-
Central Kansas as the omitted base group.
10
 The effect of these variables on costs is an 
empirical question; they are included to capture any differences in perceived costs caused 
by regional variations in farming practices. The dummy variable, NRCS Wetlands tests 
for any systematic differences due to the respondent’s level of experience with wetlands. 
The presence of wildlife is measured as the number of wildlife species observed on the 
respondent’s farm (Species Observed = Deer + Quail + Songbirds + Turkey + Pheasant 
+ Other). This variable depends on two attributes about the respondent: the actual 
wildlife population on his farm and his level of attention to wildlife. Our data do not 
 18 
allow us to disentangle these two effects, but if farmers place positive values on wildlife 
and believe that wetlands improve wildlife habitat, then this variable will have a negative 
impact on perceived wetland costs.  
The characteristics of the farmer included both demographic attributes and 
attitudes toward environmental policies. The demographic variables included Male, Age, 
Education, Primary Farmer and Years Farming.  Again, the effects of many of these 
variables are empirical issues and they allow us to test to what extent costs are influenced 
by demographic factors. Two indices were created to represent attitudes toward: a) 
government regulation (Accept Regulation) and b) environmental conservation programs 
(Dislike Programs).  The first index was calculated as Accept Regulation = Wetland Regs 
Unfair + Wetland Regs Costly + Environmental Laws Unfair.  Lower values of Accept 
Regulation indicate opposition to government regulation, while higher values indicate 
increasing acceptance of regulation.  We hypothesize that Accept Regulation will be 
negatively correlated with the perceived cost of wetlands.  The second index is Dislike 
Programs = Protect Animals + Protect Plants + Buy Land For Habitat + Pay For 
Habitat. Lower values of Dislike Programs indicate agreement with favourable 
statements about environmental conservation programs while higher values imply 
disagreement with these statements. We expect that Dislike Programs will be positively 
correlated with perceived costs. The correlation between the two indices was -0.17.   
Results 
Tobit estimation results for the wetland cost function are in table 3. The coefficient on 
Percent Wetland Coverage is positive, as expected, and statistically significant.  The 
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marginal effect indicates that an additional percent of wetland coverage (i.e., 1.6 
additional wetland acres in the quarter-section) increases perceived costs by about 
$0.60/acre (or about $97 for the quarter –section).11  
Increasing dispersion of the wetland area is viewed as contributing very 
significantly to reduced rental value.  The marginal effect on 4 Wetland Areas indicates 
that the additional cost of having the wetland dispersed in four separate areas instead of 
in one area is $4.23 per acre.  The additional cost of having 16 wetland areas versus 
having one area with the same total coverage is $10.47 per acre.  Clearly respondents 
viewed the inconvenience of having to farm around many smaller wet areas as being very 
costly.
12
  
Frequency of hydration also affects costs nonlinearly. Relative to wetlands that 
are hydrated 1 year in every 5 (20% frequency), wetlands that are wet 2, 3, and 4, years in 
five have costs which are higher by $1.10, $1.01, and $1.17 per acre, respectively with no 
statistically significant differences among those three categories.  As discussed in the 
conceptual section, one explanation for this behavior is production risk: over some range 
an increase in frequency of hydration may not increase costs because returns on the 
farmed wetland area are negatively correlated with returns on the upland acreage.  
Permanent wetlands (i.e., those hydrated 5 years out of every 5) are much more costly, 
with average costs $2.28 per acre above the base group.  
 Among the farm characteristics, Total Acres has a negative impact on perceived 
wetland costs, indicating the presence of economies of scale. However, the estimated 
elasticity at the mean (-0.069) suggests that the scale effect is small in magnitude. The 
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coefficient on NRCS Wetlands is not statistically significant, suggesting no discernable 
differences in the responses of farmers with and without NRCS designated wetlands. The 
regional dummy variables representing western Kansas have positive and significant 
coefficients, suggesting that those producers place a higher cost on having wetlands that 
do those in the base area – North Central Kansas.  Species Observed has a negative and 
significant coefficient, supporting the hypothesis that farmers who observe more wildlife 
view wetlands as less costly. As pointed out above, this result arises because farmers with 
more wildlife on their farm value the habitat that wetlands provide, or because an 
individual’s attention to wildlife is likely correlated with their preference for 
environmental preservation.   
Among the demographic variables, both Age and Education have significant 
correlation with perceived costs. Older producers view wetlands as more costly compared 
to younger producers, while more educated producers and respondents for whom 
agriculture is the primary occupation perceive costs to be lower. Gender and years 
farming the land do not systematically influence the perceived costs of wetlands. As 
hypothesized, the coefficient for Accept Regulation is negative, implying that producers 
with greater opposition to environmental regulation view wetlands as more costly. Also 
as hypothesized, Dislike Programs is positive—farmers with less favorable attitudes 
toward conservation programs perceive wetlands to be more costly. 
Predicted costs from the tobit model (table 4) show average costs ranging from a 
low of $1.72/acre up to $15.31/acre for highly dispersed permanent wetlands. In our 
sample, producers with an interest in draining or filling wetlands indicated average costs 
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of $282 and $350 per acre of wetland for doing so.  Thus, even for scenario with the 
lowest perceived annual cost ($1.72/acre = $275 for the quarter section), the net present 
value of converting wetland areas is clearly positive.  The predicted costs clearly 
illustrate the effects of dispersion viz-a-viz increases in wetland area.  For example, the 
average cost associated with one seasonal wetland covering 1% of the area is $2.05/acre 
(i.e., the average of the 1
st
 four entries in the 1
st
 data column).   Quadrupling the wetland 
area to cover 4% increases costs by 64% to an average of $3.36/acre,  while dispersing 
same 1% wetland coverage from one contiguous area to 16 separate smaller areas 
increases cost by over 450% to an average of $11.28/acre.  
In sum, the wetland characteristics appear to be more important determinants of 
perceived wetland costs than the other groups of variables, and these characteristics 
generally affect costs in a nonlinear and irregular fashion. Over some range, perceived 
costs do not rise (and may actually fall) from increased frequency of hydration. The 
results also suggest that farmers would gain considerably from reducing wetland 
dispersion. These findings have some interesting policy implications, which are discussed 
in the following section. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
We analyze farmers’ perceived costs of having wetland areas in cropland and our data 
suggests that those costs can be substantial; as high as 56% of farmland rental value in 
our survey of Kansas landowners. Both our conceptual and empirical models paid special 
attention to the effect of wetland characteristics. Like Shultz and Taff (2004) we find that 
permanent wetlands impose significantly greater costs than temporary wetlands, but 
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within the category of temporary wetlands we found that varying the frequency of 
hydration between 40% and 80% does not impact perceived costs.
 13
  Our model predicts 
such outcomes as a consequence of the negative correlation between returns on wetland 
and upland areas. 
We also find that perceived costs vary across respondents, implying that the social 
cost of regulations that restrict wetland conversion may depend on who bears those costs. 
Both age and education were significant determinants of perceived costs in our survey 
data; younger and more educated producers perceived wetlands to be less costly.  
Variation in perceived costs across farms has implications for how wetland policies 
should be targeted. Federal programs exist to provide cost sharing of wetland restoration 
or enhancement activities (Environmental Quality Incentives Program) and to remove 
wetlands from crop production (the Wetland Reserve Program). Our results suggest that 
these programs would be most effective if targeted to younger, more educated producers 
with larger operations.  Furthermore, as suggested by a reviewer, another implication of 
the age and education results is that there is scope for public intervention (via extension 
education, training and demonstrations) to modify perceived costs. 
The perceived costs we elicit do not directly reflect welfare losses that may arise 
from restrictions on wetland conversion (such as those embodied in the Swampbuster 
provisions).  To illustrate, consider the market value of three land sections of otherwise 
equal quality – Section A containing no wetlands, Section B containing wetlands with no 
restriction on conversion, and Section C containing wetlands where, for simplicity, we 
assume the option to convert has been eliminated.  In a well functioning market, the 
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difference in price between B and C will reflect the cost imposed by the conversion 
restriction.  However, this difference depends on both the costs and benefits of 
conversion, the benefits being the net present value of the annual costs associated with 
the presence of wetlands (i.e., reduced productivity, inconvenience) that are eliminated 
by the conversion. For example, suppose A is worth $100/acre and that the cost of 
converting the wetlands in Section B or C is $15/acre. Also suppose initially that the 
benefits of conversion are larger than the costs at $20/acre. In this case, B will be worth 
$85/acre and will be converted, (a potential buyer would obtain a parcel with a 
productive value of $100 but would have to pay the $15 conversion cost), while C will be 
worth $80/acre (a potential buyer would suffer the $20 in lost productivity from 
wetlands).  Thus, when the benefits of conversion exceed the costs, conversion 
restrictions such as Swampbuster impose a cost equal to the difference between those 
benefits and costs ($5 in this case).  Conversely, if the benefits of conversion are less than 
$15/acre (say $10/acre) then both B and C will be worth $90/acre and neither will be 
converted.  The restrictions, in this case, impose no cost.  Estimating the welfare impact 
of Swampbuster type provisions would thus require detailed information on the costs of 
conversion, which, like the benefits, undoubtedly also depend on wetland characteristics.   
Consistent with the prediction from our theoretical model, our analysis found that 
wetland dispersion unambiguously increases the perceived cost associated with wetlands.  
We found, for example, that increasing dispersion of wetlands from 1 area to 4 areas 
contributes more to costs than either increasing the frequency of hydration from 20% to 
100%, or increasing the size of a single contiguous wetland from 1% to 4% of the land 
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area in a 160acre quarter section. This finding suggests that there is scope for cost savings 
from flexible policies that allow landowners to “redistribute” wetlands. Since the 1996 
Farm Act, producers have been allowed to drain or fill a wetland if an equivalent wetland 
area is restored or enhanced elsewhere. A farmer who operates a field with a highly 
dispersed wetland, say with 16 separate wetland areas, would save substantial annual 
costs if he were allowed to fill or drain those areas. The farmer must undertake a 
restoration or enhancement activity to offset this change, but the additional annual costs 
incurred from doing so may be small or even negative in some cases. Costs will be lowest 
if the restoration leads to an incremental increase in the size or frequency of hydration of 
an existing wetland which is not dispersed. 
Even though annual wetland costs may be reduced by redistributing wetlands, the 
social net benefits would depend on the initial cost of filling one wetland and restoring 
another, as well as on the change in the stream of environmental benefits from the 
redistribution. Like the costs of wetlands, the benefits they provide are also highly 
contextual and the replacement of several smaller wetlands with a single wetland of equal 
total area may either increase or decrease the environmental benefits.  This understanding 
is embodied in current federal rules governing redistribution. Restored or enhanced 
wetland must replicate the habitat and ecosystem services of the original wetland as 
nearly as possible, with the final authorization to be made by NRCS officials (Moore 
1996).  In situations in which contiguous wetlands are more beneficial for wildlife than 
several smaller dispersed areas, subsidies to encourage redistribution from dispersed to 
contiguous wetlands have the potential to deliver a net welfare benefit. Thus, while 
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farmers are currently permitted to redistribute wetlands, there may be circumstances in 
which they should be encouraged to do so, and such encouragement would be consistent 
with the current federal goal of moving beyond “no net loss” to increasing the overall 
area in wetlands.  
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Table 1. Willingness-to-Pay Values for Renting Cropland Containing Wetlands 
Number and type of 
wetland areas 
 
Mean WTP 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
N 
 
WTP = 0 
 
WTP =(>)$35
a
 
 ------- $ per acre ------- ---- Number of Observations ---- 
1 permanent 31.43 5.06 842 11 199(1) 
4 permanent 27.12 6.31 839 13 42(0) 
 16 permanent 16.76 10.16 839 154 13(0) 
1 seasonal  31.85 5.87 810 15 289(2) 
4 seasonal  28.41 6.71 810 15 102(2) 
 16 seasonal 19.77 10.17 809 101 25(1) 
a
 Note: $35/acre is given as the rental rate for similar quality land without wetlands. 
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Table 2. Producer Characteristics and Attitudes 
Item Variable Name
a
 Mean St. Dev. 
Farm and Producer Characteristics 
   
     Acres owned 
Total Acres  
512.8 639.5 
     Acres rented 792.4 848.6 
     Land has NRCS-Designated Wetlands? (1=yes) NRCS Wetlands 0.16 0.37 
       Would drain wetlands if allowed (1=yes)  0.71 0.50 
       Would fill wetlands if allowed (1=yes)  0.56 0.50 
       Frequency wetlands can be harvested (years/5)  2.83 1.31 
       Estimated wetland productivity
b
  3.35 1.32 
     Index of Species Observed 
      Deer+Quail+Songbirds+Turkey+Pheasant+Other 
Species Observed 4.13 1.15 
     Idle land to help wildlife (1=yes)  0.25 0.43 
     Age (years) Age 54.5 13.2 
     Education (years) Education 13.9 2.15 
     Gender (1=male, 0=female) Male 0.98 0.13 
     Agriculture is primary occupation (1=yes) Primary Farmer 0.91 0.28 
     Years farm has been owned Years Farming 54.9 32.9 
     Children in household (1=yes)  0.92 0.27 
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     Child likely to farm (1=yes)  0.55 0.50 
Producer Attitudes 
   
     Not draining or filling wetlands (Likert scale)
 c
    
           is beneficial to wildlife  2.82 1.14 
           reduces my annual income  2.01 0.92 
           reduces the value of my farm  2.01 0.98 
      Do you agree or disagree that (Likert scale)
 c
    
           Endangered animals should be protected  2.74 0.99 
           Endangered plants should be protected  3.00 1.00 
           State should buy land to protect species   3.90 1.11 
           State should pay farmers to protect species  2.37 1.14 
      Index – dislike for environmental programs Dislike Programs 12.01 3.05 
           Wetland protection is unfair to producers  2.00 0.94 
           Wetland protection is costly for producers  1.91 0.87 
           Environmental laws are unfair to producers  1.68 0.78 
      Index – acceptance of regulation Accept Regulation 5.58 2.16 
a Variables used in the Tobit model (table 3);  b 1 = 25% or more above the average of surrounding non-wetland acres, 2 = 10% above 
average, 3 = about average, 4 = 10% below average, 5 = 25% or more below average; c 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = 
disagree, 5 = strongly disagree  
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Table 3. Tobit Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient 
Estimate 
Student 
t-ratio
a
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Wetland Attributes     
Intercept -0.967 -0.65  
Percent Wetland 
Coverage 
0.692  7.96 0.604 
4 Wetland Areas 4.844 21.13 4.231 
16 Wetland Areas 11.99 50.67 10.472 
Wet 2 Years in 5 1.256 3.32 1.097 
Wet 3 Years in 5 1.157 3.04 1.011 
Wet 4 Years in 5 1.334 3.48 1.165 
Wet 5 Years in 5 2.607 8.79 2.278 
    
Producer/Farm Attributes   
Total Acres (000) -0.400 -4.36 -0.371 
NRCS Wetlands -0.263 -1.00 -0.229 
Species Observed -0.205 -2.38       -0.179 
Accept Regulation -0.249 -5.06 -0.218 
Dislike Programs 0.071 2.09 0.062 
 8 
Age 0.081 9.85 0.071 
Education -0.126 -2.64 -0.110 
Male -1.076 -1.18 -0.940 
Primary Farmer -0.967 -2.64 -0.845 
Years Farming 0.003 0.95 0.002 
    
North East (NE) 0.233 0.74 0.204 
South East (SE) 0.254 0.86 0.222 
South Central (SC) -0.494 -1.59 -0.431 
South West (SW) 0.727 1.96 0.635 
North West (NW) 0.646 1.69 0.564 
    
Observations 3995   
a
 At a significance level of 0.1, the critical value for a two-tailed test that a coefficient equals zero is 1.64. 
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Table 4. Predicted Cost of Wetlands ($ per acre) 
     
 ----- Wetland coverage ----- 
Number and type of wetland areas (prob. 
wet) 
1% 2% 3% 4% 
1 seasonal (20%) 1.72 2.10 2.42 2.46 
1 seasonal (40%) 2.26 2.79 2.99 3.68 
1 seasonal (60%) 2.09 2.55 3.01 3.62 
1 seasonal (80%) 2.13 2.58 3.05 3.66 
1 permanent (100%) 2.93 3.47 3.89 4.45 
4 seasonal (20%) 4.42 5.08 5.61 5.66 
4 seasonal (40%) 5.34 6.17 6.46 7.44 
4 seasonal (60%) 5.07 5.80 6.48 7.36 
4 seasonal (80%) 5.14 5.83 6.53 7.41 
4 permanent (100%) 6.38 7.13 7.73 8.45 
16 seasonal (20%) 10.48 11.55 12.13 12.18 
16 seasonal (40%) 11.78 12.58 13.19 14.21 
16 seasonal (60%) 11.36 12.35 13.20 14.31 
16 seasonal (80%) 11.48 12.09 13.08 14.08 
16 permanent (100%) 13.01 13.78 14.57 15.31 
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Figure 1. Effects of rainfall (x) and proneness to hydration (h) on wetland returns 
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In this question, we want you to tell us the maximum rental rate you would pay for crop-
land that contains some wetland areas that are always too wet to farm, when tracts of 
similar quality land with no wetlands rent for $35 per acre.  
The diagram below shows a section of land divided into four quarter-sections of 160 
acres. Section A contains no wetland areas and can be rented for $35/acre. Sections B, 
C, and D each contain 1.6 acres (1 percent) of wetland areas that are always too wet to 
farm.  The shaded areas represent the wetland areas.  
Please fill in the maximum rental rate per acre that you would pay for the entire acreage 
in each of Sections B, C, and D.  Note that sections B, C, and D each contain exactly 
the same total area of wetlands. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample contingent valuation survey question for permanent wetlands 
A B
C D
A. NO WETLANDS
     Rent is $35/acre
B. 1% WETLAND
     Maximum I would
     pay is _____ $/acre
C. 1% WETLAND
     Maximum I would
     pay is _____ $/acre
D. 1% WETLAND
     Maximum I would
     pay is _____ $/acre
 Footnotes 
 
1
 Program benefits subject to this eligibility requirement include all types of production flexibility contract 
payments, price supports, marketing loans, farm credit program loans, contract payments under the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program, and assistance under the Watershed Protection and Flood 
Prevention Act. This inclusive definition of farm programs implies a near universal impact on farmers in 
the plains states.  
2
 The regulations define wetland “conversion” as activities including draining, dredging, filling, levelling, 
removing woody vegetation, or “any other activity that results in impairing or reducing the flow and 
circulation of water.” (7 CFR 12.2 (a)). 
3
 Some areas however, are always too wet to cultivate – a category we refer to as permanent wetlands in 
our model below. Wetland regulations make a distinction between “farmed wetlands” and “wetlands 
farmed under natural conditions.” The difference is that “farmed wetlands” were manipulated in some way 
(e.g., partially drained or filled) before the 1985 cut-off date, while “wetlands farmed under natural 
conditions” are those that have been disturbed only by cropping activities and are otherwise in their natural 
state. Our “temporary wetlands” classification can be interpreted as including both these categories.  
4
 As noted by a reviewer it is not desirable to have untrained personnel assist with the interpretation of 
survey questions.  However, the handful of cases in which fieldmen were actually contacted involved issues 
such as when the survey should be returned and who was conducting the research rather than questions of 
interpretation.  
5
 Seasonal wetland questions were identically presented except that respondents were told the wetland areas 
“may be too wet to farm,” and were given the average number of years out of every five these areas are too 
wet to harvest. 
6
 An alternative format is a dichotomous choice question, which elicits a yes-no response to a given bid 
amount. Varying bids within a sample allows for estimation of a willingness-to-pay function, although 
more responses are required to obtain the same statistical properties because each response contains less 
 2 
 
information.  In our survey, employing a dichotomous choice format with four bid levels would increase 
the number of alternative versions from 16 to 64.  We were also concerned that the normal variation in 
response rates across versions would result in some “cells” with very few responses, and create problems 
with the statistical analysis.  
7
 As a reviewer pointed out, however, farmers’ responses may still have been affected by their own 
operational constraints influencing their demand for rented land. Some may have reported low (high) bids 
for fields B, C, and D because their willingness to pay for field A was less (more) than  $35 per acre. We 
attempt to control for these differences by including operational characteristics (e.g., acres farmed) in our 
empirical model. A related but more subtle issue is that respondents may not have viewed the three 
questions independently (e.g., they may have reported a low value for field D because they thought they 
had already committed to renting B and C). Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis because the fields 
were always presented in the same arrangement. Finally, a reviewer also noted that respondents may have 
inferred something negative about the quality of the non-wetland areas in parcels with more wetlands. 
While that possibility cannot be eliminated, we would argue that the availability of similar quality land for 
$35/acre indicates to respondents that all the non-wetland area under consideration is of similar quality. 
Furthermore the issue of different quality for non-wetland areas was not raised by the participants in our 
pre-tests. 
8
 Because there are only 6 such observations our results are not sensitive to the way they are treated.  
9
 Polynomial functional forms were also rejected by the LR test.  For example, when a quadratic term for 
percent coverage was added to the model reported in table 3, neither the linear nor quadratic coefficients 
were statistically significant and the log of the likelihood function increased by only 0.55. Gelso, Fox and 
Peterson (2007) contains results from these and other model specifications, in addition to a copy of the 
survey instrument.   
10
 See http://www.agecon.ksu.edu/KFMA/new%20web/web04map.pdf for a map of the KFMA regions.  
11
 In the dummy variable formulation, costs for fields with wetland coverage of 2% and 3% were 
$0.70/acre and $0.90/acre higher relative to fields with 1% coverage, and the difference between 2% and 
 3 
 
3% coverage was not statistically significant.  Costs for 4% coverage were estimated to be $1.95/acre 
higher than costs for 1% coverage. 
12
 Following Johnston, Swallow and Bauer 2002, we also estimated models using an Edge/Area Ratio 
variable.  However, because the shape of the wetland areas depicted in our instrument was identical in all 
its representations, the Edge/Area Ratio was highly correlated with the number of wetlands.  Johnston, 
Swallow and Bauer 2002 also show how variation in the cartographic representation of a spatial feature can 
influence CVM responses.  In our surveys, the spatial distribution of wetland areas was constant but it is 
worth noting that variation in that feature would probably have influenced our results.   
13
 As suggested by a reviewer, results from hedonic studies based on market transaction data (such as 
Schultz and Taff 2004) will differ from ours depending on the frequency that landlords obtain “full rental 
value” for land containing (potentially costly) wetlands.    
 
